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ABSTRACT
As technology advances and society becomes more 
dependent on information technology (IT), the exposure to 
vulnerabilities and threats increase. In the year 2000 the 
"I love you" virus, was able to cause over $2 billion in 
damages worldwide. Many cyber threats have been reported 
and documented throughout the advancement of IT, resulting 
in not only monetary damages but invasion of privacy and 
risks to national security. Realizing the need for 
enhanced cyber security and information security 
management criteria, federal regulations have mandated the 
capability, provision, and notification of cyber security 
incidents. In this new direction, incident response plays 
an essential role in cyber security. It is one of the last 
lines of defense and is vital in the event of a 
cyber-catastrophe. However measuring the performance and 
creating accountability for computer security incident 
response (CSIR) capabilities still remains an issue. Many 
government organizations still struggle to determine what 
security metrics to use and how to find value within them.
In this effort a metrics framework has been developed 
for incident response to serve as an internal analysis, 
supporting continuous improvement in incident reporting 
and strengthening the security posture for an 
organization's mission. There are five elements that are 
critical to the metrics framework for CSIR:
1) understanding the three types of measures,
2) establishing objective driven metrics, 3) produce 
results based on audience considerations, 4) tie incident 
response (IR) evaluations to improve IR capabilities that 
support the organization's mission, and 5) process flow 
identification for CSIR. The goal of this metrics 
framework for (CSIR) aims to provide a holistic approach 
towards security metrics which is specific to incident 
reporting and promotes efforts of more practical and clear 
guidelines on measuring the computer security incident 
response team (CSIRT). An additional benefit to this 
project is that it provides middle management with a 
framework for measuring the results of incident reporting 
in a CSIR program.
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As technology becomes more prevalent and reliance on 
IT expands, the exposure to vulnerabilities and threats 
increase. Malware, social engineering, and zero day 
attacks have evolved to outpace current IT security 
controls. In the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review by the 
White House, the United States (US) acknowledged its need 
for more reliable, resilient, and trustworthy digital 
infrastructure for the future (White House, 2009). 
Realizing the need for enhanced cyber security and 
information security management criteria, federal 
regulations have mandated the capability, provision, and 
notification for cyber security incidents (H.R. 2458—56). 
The United States-Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(US-CERT) requires incidents by category type for computer 
security incident response to be reported within specific 
timeframes. The requirement creates an audit trail for the 
purpose of awareness and collaboration. However, the main 
concern drawn from this initiative is accountability. How 
can an organization follow alerts, check validations, and 
track remediation efforts? What controls are in place to 
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determine if appropriate reporting methods exist and are 
being used properly? How can an organization verify that 
requirements are being met? Additionally, in the event 
that reporting methods are confirmed, how can 
organizations measure performance? By examining the 
federal work space, it is apparent that federal agencies 
are required to adhere to the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 (H.R. 2458—56), Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) directives (0MB Circular No. 
A-130, Appendix III), and the Department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) US-CERT timeframe reporting requirements 
(US-CERT, 2011). In this effort the metrics framework for 
incident response has been developed to serve as an 
internal analysis, supporting continuous improvement in 
incident reporting and strengthening the security posture 
for an organization's mission.
Purpose of the Project
The purpose of this metrics framework for CSIR aims 
to provide a holistic approach towards security metrics 
which is specific to incident reporting and promotes 
efforts of more practical and clear guidelines on 
measuring the CSIRT. In addition, the purpose of this 
project is to provide middle management with a framework 
2
for measuring the results of incident reporting in a CSIR 
program.
Problem Background
From the birth of the Computer Emergency Response 
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) in 1988 (Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team, 2011A) to the establishment of 
the US-CERT1 in 2003 (US-CERT, 2008), the US has 
acknowledged the need for real cyber security and CSIR 
reporting. In 1988 the Morris Worm, a self-replicating 
program, brought over 6000 computers worldwide to its 
knees (Garfinkel, 2005) . In 1999 the Melissa Virus used 
Microsoft's Word and Excel exploits to propagate itself 
across the net via email (Mills, 2009) . In 2000 the "I 
love you" bug, very similar to the Melissa Virus, added 
the ability to destroy data causing over $2 billion in 
damages worldwide (PC Tools, 2010). Today, countries such 
as Estonia and Georgia are examples of when nation states 
have been incapacitated by the real dangers of 
cyber-attacks (Davis, 2007; & Markoff, 2008). Cyber 
threats now persist in the expansion of attack 
sophistication and in intruder knowledge (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2010). Since these events, efforts 
1 US-CERT is the operating arm of the National Cyber Security 
Division (NCSD) at DHS
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for Public Private Partnership (PPP) and. the construction 
of the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) have demonstrated the 
new direction that the US government and US military are 
partaking (Armed Forces Communications & Electronics 
Associate, 2010). In this new direction, incident 
reporting plays the role of networking and collaboration. 
It is- one of the last lines of defense and is vital in the 
event of a cyber-catastrophe.
The challenge to accurately determine if requirements 
are met is a tremendous difficulty to overcome. The 
Inspector General (IG) of an Agency and DHS, in pursuit of 
FISMA audits, has the role and responsibility to check if 
requirements are satisfied. Audits now move from yes and 
no questions to asking for greater detail to ensure 
compliance. As part of the "National Cybersecurity 
Strategy' the DHS has been designated the focal point for 
critical infrastructure protection, where incident 
reporting is a main component of ensuring our national 
cyber security (National Security Council, 2 011) .
Unfortunately, the past has demonstrated the lack of cyber 
security preparedness when it comes to federal agencies. 
The last review (2009) by the General Accountability 
Office (GAO) on federal wide information security controls 
stated that almost all 24 major federal agencies had 
4
weaknesses in their information security controls (General 
Accountability Office, 2009). The US government as a whole 
is now trying to move towards greater cyber security 
controls, but ensuring collaboration and accountability is 
another i s sue.
Context of the Problem
Although security metrics have gained large focus 
from government and industry, many organizations still 
struggle to determine what metrics to use and how to find 
value from them (Center for Internet Security Community, 
2009; Gorsan, Personal Communication, 2010; & Torner, 
Personal Communication, 2011). The fundamental concern 
with security metrics comes from knowing how to capture 
the cause and effect. With greater requirements for 
security controls being mandated for accountability (Joint 
Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2009), many groups 
are creating their own security metrics without 
understanding the full scope or how it connects to the 
organization's objectives. For example, in the evaluation 
of incident reporting, incident types are categorized by 
the US-CERT. Timeframe requirements for reporting are 
given with the purpose of providing a methodology for 
awareness and coordination amongst key providers of our 
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technological infrastructure. In the federal work space 
the OMB Circular No. A-130 Appendix III directs federal 
agencies to "ensure that there is a capability to provide 
help to users when a security incident occurs in the 
system and to share information concerning common 
vulnerabilities and threats" (OMB Circular No. A-130, 
Appendix III, Para. A,3,a,2,d). In addition, places like 
NIST (NIST, 2011), CIS (Center for Internet Security 
Community, 2010), and CERT/CC (Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team, 2011B) all provide guidance and various 
metrics on measuring incident response handling. The 
amount of security metrics coming from government and 
other communities make it very difficult to interpret and 
properly comprehend how to properly measure CSIR 
capabilities. The lack of a governing body or 
collaboration between security metrics within the federal 
space also makes it almost impossible to come to a 
conclusion. Furthermore, determining which security metric 
is appropriate and which to use over another can be 
frustrating. Without a consensus and with requirements and 
directives mandating greater security controls and greater 
accountability, organizations are up in arms when creating 
their own metrics for their own auditing purposes. Along 
with the chaos of trying to constantly anticipate audits 
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and reviews for specific requirements, there is a need for 
a structured metrics framework to help organizations 
achieve their objectives.
In order to measure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of incident management we must have at least a basis of 
understanding of the metrics that measure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of our organization's major 
processes. Incident management is a means to an end for an 
organization. However, it is not the end state of the 
organization. It is an end state objective. Therefore, 
when dealing with efficiency and effectiveness of incident 
management, the security metric must relate back to the 
overall organizational objective. This metrics framework 
attempts to address the confusion behind security metrics 
to provide a holistic view that aids organizations to 
better utilize security metrics, improve processes for 
incident reporting, and strengthen the organization's 
overall security posture.
Scope of the Project
The scope of this project is to develop a metrics 
framework for use in measuring CSIRT performance. This 
project specifically targets program manager's measuring 
CSIR program performance. The requirements for timeframe 
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reporting by US-CERT are applied throughout this metrics 
framework for CSIR and are used in Chapter Five 
Application of the Metrics Framework.
Significance of the Project
The significance of this project is to assist in real 
world problems such as, passing FISMA audits, achieving 
plan of actions and milestones (POA&Ms), and informing 
management of the value from having CSIR capabilities. 
Using the developed metrics framework and accompanying 
metric form, performance measurement for CSIR can be 
better structured to inform upper management on current 
CSIR capabilities, areas of CSIR that are doing well, and 
areas of CSIR that need improvement. With this developed 
metrics framework, managers can understand what they are 
measuring, why they are measuring, and how they can go 
about measuring. This will enable management to make 
better, more informed decisions in regards to continuous 
improvement for CSIR and tie security metrics to support 
the agency's mission.
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made regarding this 
project:
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1. The agency is bound by the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002 (H.R. 2458—56),
Office of Management and Budget directives (OMB
Circular No. A-130, Appendix III), and US-CERT
Government reporting requirements (US-CERT, 
2011)
2. The agency has computer security incident 
response capabilities
3. The agency is capturing CSIR data and has a 
collection of incident reports
4. The agency is using this metrics framework for 
CSIR to measure CSIR performance and 
capabilities
Limitations
During the development of this project, a number of 
limitations were noted. These limitations are as shown:
1. Some formulas apply specifically to Federal 
Government reporting requirements
2. The metrics framework is specific to measuring 
performance for computer security incident 
response capabilities
3. Accurately measuring cost will depend on the 
amount of information known for assigned costs 
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and the amount of time and effort an 
organization wishes to consume in order to 
achieve greater accuracy.
Definition of Terms
The following terms are defined as they apply to this 
proj ect.
Computer Security Incident Response Team: "an organization 
or team that provides services and support to a 
defined constituency for preventing, handling, and 
responding to computer security incidents" (Alberts, 
Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2004, p. 1).
Framework: "an essential supporting or underlying 
structure" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008, para. 13)
Incident: "any event that takes place through, on, or 
constituting information technology resources that 
requires a staff member or administrator to 
investigate and/or take action to reestablish, 
maintain, or protect the resources, services, or data 
of the community or individual members of the 
community" (Rezmierski, Deering, Fazio, & Ziobro, 
1998, p. 14) .
Measurement: "single-point-in-time views of specific, 
discrete, factors" (Payne, 2006, p. 1).
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Metric: "generated from analysis; derived by comparing to 
a predetermined baseline two or more measurements 
taken over time" (Payne, 2006, p. 1).
Triage: "The process of receiving, initial sorting, and 
prioritizing of information to facilitate its 
appropriate handling" (West-Brown, Stikvoort, 
Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2003, 
p. 191).
Personally Identifiable Information (PII): "any 
information about an individual that is maintained by 
an agency, including information that can be used to 
distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such 
as name, Social Security number, date and place of 
birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, and 
any other personally information that is linked or 
linkable to an individual" (General Accountability 
Office, 2008, p. 5).
Organization of the Project
This project is divided into six chapters. Chapter 
One provides the introduction, purpose, problem 
background, context of the problem, scope of the project, 
significance of the project, project limitations, and 
definition of terms. Chapter Two comprises of a literature 
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review on relevant works pertaining to the metrics 
framework for CSIR. Chapter Three documents the steps 
involved in developing the project including funding, 
coursework, work experience, and literature research. 
Chapter Four presents the metrics framework for CSIR and 
the measurement form for middle management to measure CSIR 
performance. Chapter Five provides an illustration for use 
of the metrics framework and measurement form. Chapter Six 
presents the conclusion and recommendations drawn from the 
development of this project. The appendices and references 
follow Chapter Six. The Appendices for the project 
consists of: Appendix A US-Cert Reporting Criteria; 
Appendix B Formulas For Computer Security Incident 
Response; Appendix C Acronyms.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduct ion
Since the early 1990s, from the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency's (DARPAs) push for CERT/CC to the 
establishment of US-CERT by DHS, the federal government 
has initiated multiple efforts for cyber security and CSIR 
(Ellis, Fisher, Longstaff, Pesante, & Pethia, 1997; White 
House, 2009; & Wilshusen, 2011). The efforts for 
accountability have been established under FISMA (H.R.
2458—56), OMB directives (0MB Circular No. A-130, Appendix 
III), and IG audits (Department of Homeland Security, 
2010). However, the effectiveness for measuring 
performance and compliance still remains a controversy 
(General Accountability Office, 2010; Hopkins, 2009). 
Audits have continually evolved from yes and no questions 
to how many and why (Gorsen, Personal Communication, 
2010). Efforts to effectively account for programs such as 
CSIR have become an area of concern.
This review of the literature on security metrics for
CSIR focuses on the following questions:
1) How can computer security incident Response be 
measured?
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2) What types of security measurements exist for!i 
computer security incident response? ;
I
Measurement Types for Computer ;
Security Incident Response Ii
There is a wide variety of reputable publications
i
illustrating measurement types and metrics for CSIR. In 
the NIST Special Publication 800-55 Revision 1, Chew, |
ISwanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson (2008) define 
i 
measurement types for information security as ;
implementation, effectiveness/efficiency, and impact. The 
authors establish that these are measurement types but
i 
they are actually purposes, the drive for measuring 1
I 
information security. In another NIST publication, NIST
iSpecial Publication 800-61 Revision 1, Scarfone, Grance,
i
and Masone (2008) suggest possible metrics for CSIR as the
.1 
number of incidents handled, time per incident, objectlive !
assessment of each incident, and subjective assessment! of
each incident. These metrics are very practical but [
i 
suggest only a small portion of possible metrics and I
measurement types for measuring CSIR. In another technical
report from Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering
Institute (SEI), Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, Zajicek 
(2007), measures incident management based on common 
functions and processes within CSIR work flow. Their 
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approach to measure CSIR capabilities, also stated as 
incident management capabilities, is based on evaluating 
business functions. This form of measuring CSIR looks 
primarily at overall performance, while attempting to 
apply its own scoring rubric to business functions within 
CSIR. An additional measurement type or scale is defined 
by Allen & Davis (2010) as nominal, ordinal, interval, and 
ratio. These are specific measurement types based on 
possible mathematic operations and measurable service 
types for CSIR. Lastly, another insight into the types of 
measurements for CSIR is suggested by Gartner Analyst and 
metrics expert Jeffrey Wheatman (2010) as cost, time, and 
quality for any metric. Wheatman's statement of cost, 
time, and quality for metrics is based on common sense and 
practical knowledge. Compared to the various types of 
measurement or metrics suggested from other authors, 
Wheatman's approach to measurement types of security 
metrics in CSIR is holistic because it provides the 
flexibility to measure for any purpose or objective.
Three Types of Measurements: 
Cost, Time, and Quality
Measurements of cost, time, and quality are evident 
in business as the 'iron triangle', but the terms are used 
in a different context for this metrics framework for
15
CSIR. Atkinson (1999) reviews the measurements of cost, 
time, and quality as it pertains to project management. 
The tradeoffs that exist within a project are similar to a 
cost benefit analysis that is useful to project 
management. However, for this metrics framework for CSIR, 
Wheatman's (2010) basic concept of cost, time, and quality 
is used for the three measurement types. Allen and Davis 
(2010), in a technical report agree with the definition of 
cost as a value of money. The evaluation of cost is taken 
in a literal sense as encompassing only financial value, 
meaning dollars and cents. Scarfone, Grance, and Masone
(2008) refer to time as the time an incident occurs to the 
time it is resolved. The importance of time as a 
measurement is referenced to timeframe or duration of an 
incident. As for quality, West-Brown, Stikvoort, 
Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, Zajicek (2003) identify 
quality as quality parameters that are common between 
services or functions. Quality is defined as good or bad 
based on how well the expectation level and set parameters 
are met. The three types of measurements for CSIR exist 
throughout aspects of publications regarding CSIR.
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Security Metrics
There are numerous publications for security metrics, 
but there is not one governing source that combines the 
efforts of creating security metrics. Chew, Swanson, 
Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson (2008) provide a guide 
for creating measurement for information security 
programs. They provide a comprehensive guide that is very 
useful for measuring information security. Additionally, 
the Center for Internet Security Community (2010) has 
derived 28 metric definitions that apply broadly to 7 
information security programs such as, incident 
management, vulnerability management, patch management, 
application security, configuration management, and 
financial metrics. They emphasize providing common metrics 
and definitions that support measurement of important 
business functions. In addition, Jansen (2009) indicates 
the direction of security metrics research going towards 
formal models and security measurement and metrics, 
historical data collection and analysis, artificial 
intelligence assessment techniques, practical concrete 
measurement methods, and intrinsically measurable 
components. Security metrics is on the path stated by \
Jansen and evidence of more practical and formal models 
are demonstrated by the effort of this project.
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Objective Driven Measurements
The purpose of a measurement is to serve a particular 
objective. Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and 
Robinson (2008) state that organizations should define the 
scope of their .information security measurement program 
based off strategic goals and objectives among other 
things. In an interview with Barbara Gorsen (2010), Gorsen 
states that objectives need to be clearly defined before 
pursuing measurements within CSIR. Allen and Davis (2010) 
identify the importance of establishing objectives as a 
basis for measurements. Measurements, therefore, are 
derived from objectives to validate the reason for 
assessment. Lastly, in the Security Measurement and 
Analysis Project by Carnegie Mellon's SEI, Alberts, Allen, 
and Stoddard (2011) discuss mission-objective-driver 
protocols that drive analysis. This metrics framework 
clearly identifies objectives as an essential criterion to 
the development of measurements and to drive the basis for 
evaluation.
Process Flow Identification
Identifying incident response capabilities process 
flow provides a map of how an incident is handled from 
start to finish. In a technical report from Carnegie
18
Mellon's SEI, Alberts, Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, and 
Zajicek (2004) define incident management processes for 
CSIRTs using a process model. The process model for 
incident management outlines and documents process 
activities to aid in benchmarking. The common processes 
for evaluation are stated as: "Prepare/Sustain/Improve 
(Prepare), Protect Infrastructure (Protect), Detect Events 
(Detect), Triage Events (Triage), and Respond" (Alberts, 
Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2004, p. 8). 
Additionally, recommendations for creating a CSIRT by 
Scarfone, Grance, and Masone (2009) address the need for 
developing incident response procedures that cover all the 
phases of the incident response process. There is a direct 
correlation between understanding and documenting 
processes and benefiting from it when measuring CSIR 
capabilities. Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and 
Robinson (2008) state that developing performance measures 
in advance during the creation of a security program 
allows for the benefit and ease of security metrics. 
Understanding the processes for improvement is again 
stated by Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, and Zajicek (2007) 
as essential for metrics evaluating incident management 
capabilities. Identifying and being aware of processes 
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enables for more accurate measurements and offers process 
improvement opportunities.
Audience Based Metrics
The notion of audience based measurements derives 
from professional experience, personal communication, and 
from the idea that different perspectives exist. Gartner 
analyst Michael Smith (2010) discussed the importance of 
understanding the audience and their expectations, and 
their needs associated with their position as a 
stakeholder within CSIR. Additionally, Niven (2008) 
addresses the four perspectives that exist for a balanced 
scorecard. This includes the customer perspective, 
internal process perspective, financial perspective, and 
employee learning and growth perspective. The concept of 
different views as a basis for metric requirements was 
essential in the development of audience based metrics.
Tying Security Metrics to Organization's Mission
Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson 
(2008) state that federal agencies need to link 
information security with enterprise strategic planning. 
West-Brown, Stikvoort, Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, and 
Zajicek (2003) also state that CSIRTs mission must 
complement the organization's mission. The point of 
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information security efforts is to support the agency's 
overall goals and objectives. Additionally, in an 
interview with Gartner Analyst Michael Smith (2010), Smith 
noted that the point of CSIR is to assist in the agency's 
mission. Therefore, measuring CSIR should follow suit by 
looking at ways to improve CSIR capabilities to support 
the agency's mission. Tying security metrics to the 
organization's mission is vital to the success of security 
metrics for CSIR.
Summary
The literature important to the project was presented 
in Chapter Two. The analysis of the above literature was 
essential in establishing a foundation of past and current 
literature relevant to CSIR. In addition, the literatures 
most relevant to the components of the metrics framework 
for CSIR were reviewed. From these literatures the metrics 
framework moves forward in an effort to support 
collaboration and practical security metrics for CSIR.
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CHAPTER THREE
FORMATION OF THE PROJECT
Introduc t ion
In order to bring value to this metrics framework for 
CSIR, it was important to incorporate higher level 
education, work experience, and literature research 
regarding current initiatives and best practices for CSIR. 
The formation of this project involved gaining the 
knowledge and experience necessary to fully comprehend 
what is needed for security metrics in CSIR. In order to 
make this possible I pursued an intensive course at 
Carnegie Mellon, a 10 week internship under the program of 
incident management, and conducted an in-depth research 
and analysis for existing documentation relevant to CSIR 
best practices.
The knowledge gained from this project was attained 
through the following activities:
Coursework
Coursework: Software Engineering Institute by 
Carnegie Mellon - Fundamentals of Incident Response 
Handling (5 days intensive course - Arlington, Virginia) 
Description: "The course is designed to provide 
insight into the work that an incident handler may 
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perform. It provided an overview of the incident handling 
arena, including CSIRT services, intruder threats, and the 
nature of incident response activities" (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2011, para. 2).
Internship
Information Security Office, CSUSB: Practical 
experience with vulnerability assessments using Nessus and 
the intrusion detection system using Snort. Internship 
offered hands on experience dealing with incidents from 
internal controls within a university setting (2 years 
part-time - San Bernardino, California).
Incident Management, Cyber Security Division, 
Department of Treasury: Discussion with System One 
(Contractor) Senior Analyst, Barbara Gorsen, and Gartner 
Analyst, Michael Smith, on metrics framework for CSIR. 
Additionally, I conducted an internal analysis on incident 
reporting.2 I also assisted with preparations for FISMA 
and inspector general (IG) audits under the sections 
related to incident management (10 weeks Full-time - 
Washington, District of Columbia).
2 Sensitive But Unclassified: details unavailable for disclosure.
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The education and internship experiences were 
necessary to give me a solid foundation into CSIR and how 
analysis on CSIR capabilities really worked. From that 
point I analyzed the existing literature to extract the 
best practices and create a clear, more practical 
framework for measuring CSIR.
Literature Research
The literature research conducted for this project 
involved analysis of originating documentation for CSIR to 
current best practices used in the field. Thanks to the 
coursework and internships, I received direction from 
professionals in the field, enabling me to start my 
literature research on target.
The original documentation for CSIR starts with 
Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Response
Team/Coordination Center's (CERT CC) Handbook for Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams. The best practices and 
governing literature on CSIR exists in NIST Special 
Publication 800-55 and 800-61, Carnegie Mellon's Software 
Engineering Institute publications and the Center for 
Internet Security's Security Metrics V.1.1.0. The 
literature research tries to encompass past and present 
documentation relevant to the field of CSIR.
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Summary
For the benefit of this project's metrics framework 
for CSIR, the full scope of education, work experience, 
and literature research was undertaken. The formation of 
the project was to understand the essential literatures 
and real work experiences that are needed to measure CSIR 
capabilities. In order to make a practical yet effective 
metrics framework for CSIR, acquiring the knowledge, 
skills, and experience were the foundation for the 
formation of this project.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METRICS FRAMEWORK FOR COMPUTER 
SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE 
Introduction
Metrics framework for CSIR, for the context of this 
project, is a basis for measuring the performance of a 
CSIR program. The framework comes from the construct of 
the different measurement types and the essential elements 
needed to determine, select, and execute a particular 
measurement within CSIR. The five elements that are 
critical to the metrics framework for CSIR include:
1) understanding the three types of measures,
2) establishing objective driven metrics, 3) produce 
measurements and results based on audience considerations,
4) tie incident response (IR) evaluations to improve IR 
capabilities that support the organization's mission, and
5) process flow identification for CSIR. The purpose of 
the metrics framework is to provide a practical guide that 
enables CSIR stakeholders to measure IR performance and 
improve IR capabilities. The following sections will go 
into detail on the major aspects of the metrics framework 
for CSIR and provide a holistic yet practical approach for 
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evaluating IR. (See Figure 1. Metrics Framework for
Computer Security Incident Response, Below)
Metrics Framework for Incident Response
Cost Time Quality
Admir istrative Le\ el View




Continuous Improvement in Incident Response < Tie > Organization’s Mission
Figure 1. Metrics Framework for Incident Response
Steps to Use the Metrics Framework
Before using the metrics framework one needs to have 
an understanding of one's agency's CSIR capabilities, its 
maturity level, and what types of measurements exist for 
evaluating CSIR. The first step is to determine what is 
the objective and purpose for measuring CSIR capabilities. 
The second step is to select what measurement to use based 
off the determination of the objective and purpose. The 
third step requires the identification of all data sources 
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and responsible parties. Then the measurement is conducted 
with the appropriate approval from management. The fourth 
step is to tailor the results specific to the needs of the 
audience base, giving consideration to viewing 
requirements. The fifth step is to assess the results and 
determine if action is needed. The sixth step is to take 
action, if needed, and review all previous steps that have 
been taken.
Three Types of Measures for Computer Security 
Incident Response
Three Measurement Types for Incident ResponseFigure 2.
Three types of measures that exist for evaluating IR 
include cost, time, and quality (See Figure 2. Three 
Measurement Types for Incident Response, Above) (Wheatman, 
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Personal Communication, August 2010). These three measures 
provide a holistic approach towards evaluating efficiency, 
effectiveness, and implementation in an IR program. When 
evaluating incident reports, these three measures can 
overlap by comprising a mixture of two or three measures. 
For example, when using the metrics framework to evaluate 
compliance for timeframe reporting the result may require 
management to consider implementing changes that impact 
the cost of the IR program. The cost benefit analysis for 
decreasing reporting time to meet timeframe requirements 
is a measurement of quality. This involves all three 
measurement types to address compliance. Depending on the 
purpose for measuring IR, these three measurement types 
will be the foundation to evaluate and measure a CSIR 
program.
Figure 3. Cost Types for Incident Response
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Cost in CSIR is determined based on three areas:
1) the cost to maintain IR capabilities, 2) the cost to 
remediate an incident, and 3) the cost to implement change 
in an IR program (Rezmierski, Deering, Fazio, & Ziobro, 
1998; Torner, Personal Communication, February 2011) (See 
Figure 3. Cost Types for Incident Response, Above). Please 
note that cost for this metrics framework deals only with 
financial cost. There are existing formulas (See Appendix 
B) that aid in evaluating IR and offer standardized 
expressions to make IR evaluations more consistent. When 
evaluating costs for IR, the more entities that are 
identified and assigned costs, the more accurate the cost 
measurement will be. For tangible items, cost is easier to 
assign. But for intangibles such as reputation and trust 
it becomes much harder to assign a dollar amount. The 
criteria for evaluating cost for IR requires 
identification of the three cost areas and the ability to 
continually assign related costs as new costs are 
identified.
The cost to maintain CSIR capabilities and services 
include direct and indirect costs that can be attributed 
to CSIR operational costs. From an accounting perspective 
the cost of direct labor, direct material, and applied 
overhead costs should be considered (Brewer, Garrison, & 
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Noreen, 2009). Activity based costing method for 
calculation is suggested. However, the trade-off to more 
accurately assigned activity costs is the time and money 
needed to discover the cost of each activity. The best way 
to determine cost to maintain CSIR is to evaluate ones 
need to measure and how much one is willing to pay in 
order to obtain accurate cost estimates.
The cost to remediate varies depending upon the 
incident and the methods chosen to remediate. But for this 
metrics framework it is important to find common incidents 
that have relatively similar financial costs. Although 
costs will vary, it is crucial that all methods of 
remediation attribute a financial cost when applicable. As 
noted before, intangibles like trust and reputation do not 
always have an associated financial cost. Therefore, it is 
important to look at costs for either costs savings or 
improvement in remediation efforts.
Implementation costs are financial costs attributed 
from the impact of making change to CSIR capabilities. The 
cost to implement change is reliant on both the cost to 
maintain services and the cost to remediate. A cost 
benefit analysis approach is recommended for determining 
implementation costs (Xie & Mead, 2004) . The importance of 
implementation costs are determining whether or not making 
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change is worth the financial costs, given the desired 
outcome and the likelihood it would occur.
The importance of measuring time for CSIR is the 
duration between activities and the total time it takes to 
resolve an incident. This deals with points of time and 
the lengths of time in between points. In particular there 
can be two or more points that exist within a CSIR event.
The three points of time for an incident include: 1) Start 
Time, 2) the Time-in-Between, and 3) the Finish Time (See 
Figure 4. Time Measurement Points for Incident Response, 
Below).







Start Time usually is the time the incident is 
reported. It is the first recorded and realized moment 
that an incident has occurred. This statement for start 
time is probably the most important aspect of measuring 
time for CSIR because of the discrepancies that exist 
within a FISMA or IG audits. As shown in Chapter One, the 
timeframe reporting requirements US-CERT states broad to 
strict reporting times depending on the different incident 
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categories. Therefore, it only makes sense that the time 
to report only starts when an incident is reported and is 
realized, meaning the first time it is reported at the 
level being considered.
Time-in-Between deals with the many nodes an incident 
goes through as it is resolved by one or many entities. 
The finish time can either be the time the incident is 
reported as resolved or the time the incident report is 
closed out. The structure for measuring time depends on 
how an agency keeps its timestamps and what aspect of time 
it is trying to evaluate. Time in the sense of IR is all 
about how long. Determining how long offers the ability to 
gauge performance. It allows agencies to determine if 
changes are needed and how changes can affect time.
Quality is self-determined that can be subjective or 
objective or both depending on the measurement conditions 
(Scarfone, Grance, & Masone, 2008, p. 3-25) . An 
organization is able to interpret the results of an IR 
measurement and gauge whether the results are good or bad. 
Statistics such as counts for incidents initiated, 
unresolved, or resolved are interpreted based on the 
priority and values of the organization. A high number of 
reported incidents may be seen as a good thing because it 
shows that people are reporting incidents as they occur.
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However it could also mean the agency's security controls 
are not doing their job. Or, adversely, a low incident 
count could reflect that security controls are working and 
there are a less number of incidents occurring. However, 
this could just as well be the agency not reporting 
because of fear of showing that too many incidents are 
occurring. Depending on the agency's priorities and goals, 
any particular moment can drastically effect the 
interpretation of IR results and the value that exists in 
that information. Quality is thus self-determined and put 
into the interpretation of the agency based on where they 
find value in the information.
Objective Driven Measurements
It is important to establish the objective for 
maintaining a metric before introducing IR evaluations to 
an audience. This allows the audience to relate how 
measuring performance of an IR program supports the 
organization's mission. As identified in NIST Special 
Publication 800-55, security metrics must be driven by 
goals and objectives (Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, 
& Robinson, 2008). The audience must understand the 
objectives for an IR metric in advance to understand why 
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measurement of a CSIR is being conducted (Alberts, Allen, 
& Stoddard, 2011).
This component of the metrics framework is essential 
in the determination, selection, and presentation for 
measuring CSIR capabilities. Determining objective(s) is 
the first step before selecting security measurements for 
a CSIR program. A crucial part of determining objectives 
for security measurements is to evaluate organizational 
needs and the mission of the organization.
By deriving security measurements from objectives and 
goals, the results from the metric can be meaningful. 
Objective driven metrics enable the entity that is 
conducting the measurement to bring value to the 
organization using the results from the metric evaluation. 
Clearly stating the objective and goal of the measurement 
before selecting what to measure offers guidance into what 
should be measured and explains to the audience why it is 
being measured in the first place. Therefore, objective 
driven measurements are essential to the success of 
conducting security metrics for a CSIR program and gives 
consideration to organizational measurement concerns.
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Audience Based Measurements





As shown in Figure 5. Audience Based Measurements 
above, there are three identified audience groups for the 
intended user of the metrics framework: 1) administrative, 
2) operational, and 3) external. Since the intended user 
is middle management, the audience meant for the security 
measurement of a CSIR involves upper management, CSIRT 
staff, and auditors. Each audience groups have their own 
specific needs. Although their needs may overlap, their 
purpose for viewing the results of a security metric for 
CSIR and expectations of the presented information is 
quite different.
The administrative level view is based on middle to 
executive level management. Stakeholders at the 
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administrative level view may include the -Chief 
Information Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief 
Technology Officer, Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISOs), Associate CISOs, and Directors of bureau CSIRTs. 
These positions within an agency have relatively large 
amounts of responsibility for the agency and high level 
decision making powers, therefore, this group may only be 
interested in high level information and may want 
everything synthesized for the purpose of making high 
level decisions.
The operational level view includes those who are on 
the front lines dealing with the incident. It includes the 
technical staff that may want the detailed information to 
find problems within the CSIR processes. Stakeholders at 
the operational level view includes CSIRT Managers, CSIRT 
Analysts, CSIRT Operators, and all other CSIRT personnel 
that have direct contact with the CSIR processes at the 
bureau level. It is important to understand the role of 
stakeholders at the operational level because it offers 
insight into the expectation of security metrics and 
metric results. Stakeholders at the operational level may 
be interested in the cost and or time to respond to an 
incident within the bureau CSIRT.
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The external level view is for auditors, those 
outside the CSIR program that need an assessment into 
measuring CSIR performance. Stakeholders at the external 
level view include FISMA auditors by DHS, IG auditors, and 
all other entities looking at the performance measure of - 
CSIR capabilities from outside the agency. This may 
include the IG of an agency which would technically be 
inside the agency, but because of their role they are 
considered at the external level view. The importance of 
grouping this type of audience into the external level 
view is because their needs are specific to check for 
compliance against some specific standard, regulation, or 
mandate.
Understanding that the audience does matter and 
giving them consideration for the selection of security 
metrics for CSIR is important to the success of conducting 
any security metric. This is a critical aspect of the 
metrics framework because it offers the ability to 
identify measurements based on audience needs. Therefore, 
all of these views are important for selecting security 
metrics for CSIR and tailoring relevant IR metric results 
to the intended audience.
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Tying Measurements to the Agency's Mission
Tying security measurements and its results to the 
agency's mission is a crucial segment for the metrics 
framework. This makes sure that measuring CSIR is not just 
for the sake of measurements. The reason CSIR exists is to 
benefit the agency's mission. This could mean passing an 
audit so the organization is able to continue its normal 
operations or responding to a reported incident that saves 
the agency time and money. Therefore, the importance of 
measuring CSIR is to prove that it supports and enables 
the agency to accomplish its mission. By describing in 
words how the measurement ties into the agency's mission, 
we can demonstrate the value within the CSIR program.
In order to tie the security measurement to the 
agency's mission, the purpose and objective needs to drive 
the actual security metric from the beginning. If done 
properly, the objective and purpose that drives the 
security measurement for CSIR will be restated and will 
serve as the bridge to demonstrate how the CSIR program 
supports the agency's mission. An example of this could 
result in stating that the measurement is part of a series 
of measurements that is helping the organization prepare 
for an audit. Any objective can be stated as long as it 
supports the agency's mission. But it is still important 
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to make the tie on how the CSIR metric results support the 
mission so that the agency as a whole can understand the 
value behind CSIR capabilities.
Process Flow Identification
Process flow identification involves identifying the 
processes within CSIR capabilities. For a bureau, the 
process flow starts from the incident being 
reported/detected, to triaging, to remediating, to 
sustaining, and at some point reporting to the agency 
headquarters CSIRT. For an agency it is similar, except 
the agency reports to US-CERT. Depending on the makeup of 
the organization the process for notification and 
remediation will vary. Please see Figure 6. Bureau Level 
Process Flow and Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow below 
for an illustration of Bureau Level and Agency 
Headquarters Level process flows for incident reporting.
As shown in Figure 6. Bureau Level Process Flow and 
Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow below, the figures 
illustrate the processes and functions within a CSIR 
capability. They show the methods of communication such as 
phone, email, and web portal. The importance to note is 
that at the federal government level, depending on the 
CSIRTs position within an agency their process and makeup
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will vary. Notably the accuracy and greater capabilities
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Figure 6. Bureau Level Process Flow
41
Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow
In order to identify the process flow for CSIR 
capabilities it is important to identify information 
assets and stakeholders within a CSIRT. Aside from looking 
at an inventory list it is best to look at policies and 
guides produced by CSIRTs. Usually the policies will 
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outline current capabilities and processes with a bureau's 
CSIRT. However, not all organizations follow their 
existing policies and guides. It is therefore best to 
verify known process flows. A great way to determine 
process flows is through discussion with CSIRTs and 
directors of CSIRTs. This can serve to be invaluable in 
identifying process flows for CSIR capabilities.
Over time the amount of known processes and entities 
involved with CSIR capabilities will accumulate. With more 
accurate information process flow, identification can help 
determine the cost and time allotted to each entity within 
CSIR capabilities. Therefore, process flow identification 
is crucial to security metrics and offers an illustrated 
approach towards understanding an organization's CSIR 
capabilities.
Measurement Form for Computer 
Security Incident Response
The Incident Response Measurement Form I've created 
draws from NIST Special Publication 800-55 Measure 10 and 
CIS Security Metrics vl.1.0 (See Figure 8. Incident 
Response Measurement Fort Part 1, Below). The names and 
definitions for each section differ from existing 
documentation so please be sure to read the descriptions 
below.
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Incident Response Measurement Form Date: 2011 April, 05 ■ Tuesday
Author: Name
MetricID Incident Response Metric Name
Purpose & Objective Description
Measure Type Check all that apply:











Frequency □ Annual □Monthly □ Weekly □Dally □Other:
Tie to Agency Mission
Comments:
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan
Figure 8. Incident Response Measurement Form Part 1
"Metric ID" is a number and/or letter that is 
assigned by the person conducting the measurement. 
Following the Metric ID is the metric name, also given by 
the person conducting the measure.
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"Purpose & Objective" is the section where the 
purpose and objective of the measurement is stated. This 
is stated before the actual measurement formula and is 
essential to creating a meaningful measurement.
"Measurement Type" is a section with three check 
boxes that allows the user of the form to choose which of 
the three types of measures are being conducted. Please 
note that the measurement can involve one to as many as 
three measurement types in the measurement form.
"Formula" is the section where the formula for the 
measurement can be outlined and detailed. This is a 
critical part of the measurement because it enables for 
others to understand how the measurement is being 
conducted. Using formulas enables others to repeat the 
measurement and use it for their own measurement purposes.
"Description" is the section that clarifies the 
meaning of the formula. If there are any exceptions, 
notations, etc. the author of the form can explain the 
formula in detail.
"Data Source(s)" is the section where assets 
containing or controlling sources of data for the 
measurement are identified. Depending on the agency this 
can involve one or many sources of data.
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"Responsible Parties" is the section that identifies 
who is responsible for conducting and overseeing the 
measurement. This could involve technicians, analysts, 
and/or upper management.
"Audience" is a section that identifies the intended 
audience. This may comprise of one or multiple viewing 
audiences depending on the situation.
"Frequency" is the mode of measurement. It is a 
selection for periods of time for when the measurement is 
to be conducted or what points of time they wish to 
review.
"Tie to Agency Mission" is a section that tries to 
put into words how the measurement ties into the agency's 
mission.
"Comments" is a free section for the author/user to 
use this form and place any notes or comments necessary 
for the measurement. The Comment section is a space that 




All Copyrights Reserved □ 2011 Vincent Sritapan
Figure 9. Incident Response Measurement Form Part 2
Another aspect for the measurement form is the 
revision control history form that is attached to each 
metric (See Figure 9. Incident Response Measurement Form 
Part 2, Above). The above form is intended for CSIRTs and 
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CSIR stakeholders to reuse the metric ID and formula.
Aside from creating a practical and clear guide for 
security metrics regarding CSIR, this project also looks 
to promote collaborations supporting the archiving of 
security metrics.
Summary
Metrics Framework for Incident Response
Cost Time Quality
Continuous Improvement in Incident Response
Admir iistrative Level View
Open ationai Leva 1 View
Exl emal Level'Hew
Organization’s Mission
Figure 10. The Metrics Framework for Incident Response
As shown in Figure 10. The Metrics Framework for 
Incident Response, the metrics framework for CSIR includes 
three types of measurements for CSIR, cost, time, and 
quality. It identifies the need for objective driven 
measurements, the need to consider audience groups for
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measurement evaluations and presenting results, the need 
to tying measurements to the agency's mission, and the 
importance of process flow identification. The metrics 
framework for CSIR is also accompanied by a measurement 
form for CSIR. The measurement form is specifically geared 
towards utilizing the framework and creating CSIR security 
metrics. Overall, the metrics framework for CSIR is a 
product of the education, work experience, and literature 




APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Chapter Five provides a fictitious scenario that uses 
the metrics framework for CSIR including the measurement 
form. The case scenario tries to illustrate usage of the 
different types of measurements that exists for this 
framework.
Case Scenario
In this scenario, an agency containing 10 bureaus is 
making preparations at the headquarter level for a FISMA 
audit under the program of incident management. One of the 
anticipated questions is the compliance for timeframe 
reporting. The samples of incidents for the 10 bureaus, 
Bureaus A through J, are shown in Table 1. Sample Incident 
Reports. For simplification only category 1, unauthorized 
access, 2, denial of service, and 3, malicious code, 
incidents were used in this case (See Appendix A United 
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team Reporting 
Criteria for incident categories). Note that federal 
agency must adhere to US-CERT timeframe reporting 
requirements (US-CERT, 2011).
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The case scenario is an audit preparation that 
involves security measurements for timeframe reporting and 
it illustrate the use of the metrics framework for CSIR. 
Please refer to Appendix A for federal agency incident 
criteria and timeframe reporting requirements.
Before providing the sample data, it is important to 
understand that each CSIRT will have their own incident 
reports for measuring depending on their agency's CSIR 
capabilities. Some agencies may have more or less data 
points to measure depending on the maturity of their CSIR 
program. Also, as noted in the assumptions in Chapter One, 
the agency must have CSIR capabilities and must collect 
data points for measuring CSIR capabilities. The data 
points can usually be found at the CSIR Center or with the 
CSIRT. CSIRTs should have the necessary data specific to 
measuring timeframe reporting.
Before looking at the sample data Figure 10. Columns 
and Names for Sample Incident Reports describe each column 
respective to their column title. The format of the data 
for each column is shown in Figure 10. Columns and Names 
for Sample Incident Reports and described in the following 
paragraph.
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Figure 11. Columns and Names for Sample Incident Reports
Ticket 

















As shown in Figure 11. Columns and Names for Sample 
Incident Reports, "Ticket No." refers to the assigned 
number when an incident is reported to the agency 
headquarters level. "Bureau" letter is the bureau letter, 
similar to a bureau name that would represent the bureau. 
"Category" is the incident type as defined by US-CERT and 
NIST Special Publication 800-61. Notably, an incident can 
have more than one assigned category. "Subject" text is 
the subject name for the incident, which can also include 
a limited text description. "Occurred" is the estimated 
time of an incident occurrence. This can sometimes be 
exact if the data capture is electronic, but it is 
normally a perceived time that an individual determines. 
"Reported" is the time an incident is first reported at 
the bureau level. "Created" displays the time the incident 
is reported/submitted from the bureau CSIRT to the agency 
headquarter CSIRT. "Submit US-CERT" displays the time the 
incident is submitted from the agency headquarters CSIRT 
to US-CERT. Please note that the time is constructed with 
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the year, month, day, hour, minute, and second. "Type" is 
the type of incident in regards to a physical paper 
incident, equipment incident, or cyber incident. "PII" is 
the column that identifies if the incident involves 
personally identifiable information (PII). "Status" is in 
regards to whether an incident ticket no. is still open or 
if it has been closed.
Sample Data
According to the scenario, the sample incident reports 
came from the CSIRT at the agency headquarters level. The 
information from the sample incident reports is being used 
to measure performance on CSIR timeframe reporting. This is 
in preparation for the upcoming FISMA audit. The data set 
for this scenario can be found in Table 1. Sample Incident 
Reports below.
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Subject Occurred Reported Created Submit US-CERT 'Type PIT Status
1 A 1 N/A 2011.01.01.14.00.00 2011.01.01.14.45.112011.01.01.15.05.15 2011.01.01.15.15.16 Cyber Yes Closed
2 B 2 N/A 2011.01.01.16.30.00 2011.01.02.08.45.45 2011.01.02.10.15.23 2011.01.02.10.25.24 Cyber No Closed
3 C 1 N/A 2011.01.01.18.00.00 2011.01.02.10.28.13 2011.01.02.11.08.14 2011.01.02.11.18.15 Phys Yes Closed
4 D 1 N/A 2011.01.02.08.15.00 2011.01.03.11.40.26 2011.01.03.11.55.27 2011.01.03.12.05.28 Cyber Yes Closed
5 E 3 N/A 2011.01.02.14.00.00 2011.01.03.14.45.27 2011.01.03.19.45.28 2011.01.03.19.54.29 Equip NO Cpen
6 F 1 N/A 2011.01.03.12.00.00 2011.01.04.04.40.28 2011.01.04.05.33.29 2011.01.04.05.42.30 Phys Yes Closed
7 G 3 N/A 2011.01.05.04.45.00 2011.01.06.08.10.29 2011.01.06.16.10.30 2011.01.06.16.19.31 Cyber No Closed
8 H 1 N/A 2011.01.06.11.00.00 2011.01.08.14.22.30 2011.01.08.14.52.112011.01.08.15.01.12 Cyber Yes Closed.
9 I 1 N/A 2011.01.06.14.30.00 2011.01.09.20.16.312011.01.10.20.16.32 2011.01.10.21.24.33 Equip NO Open
10 J 1 N/A 2011.01.11.14.00.00 2011.01.12.14.12.12 2011.01.12.14.12.12 2011.01.12.14.20.13 Phys Yes Closed
11 A 2 N/A 2011.01.11.16.45.00 2011.01.18.07.40.312011.01.18.08.30.22 2011.01.18.08.38.23 Cyber No Closed
12 B 3 N/A 2011.02.01.11.15.00 2011.02.12.05.45.55 2011.02.14.11.45.56 2011.02.14.11.53.57 Phys NO Closed
13 B 1 N/A 2011.02.07.08.15.00 2011.02.13.07.38.25 2011.02.13.08.28.00 2011.02.13.08.36.01 Equip Yes Open
14 C 3 N/A 2011.02.17.19.30.00 2011.02.19.17.20.36 2011.02.20.11.20.37 2011.02.20.11.30.38 cyber No Closed
15 D 2 N/A 2011.02.11.07.00.00 2011.02.23.19.22.22 2011.02.23.20.12.23 2011.02.23.20.21.24 Phys Nd Closed.
16 D 1 N/A 2011.02.21.12.00.00 2011.02.24.14.40.38 2011.02.24.20.20.19 2011.02.24.20.29.20 Cyber Yes Closed
17 E 1 N/A 2011.01.07.19.30.00 2011.02.24.18.49.26 2011.02.24.18.59.112011.02.24.19.08.12 Qber Yes Closed
18 F 2 N/A 2011.01.16.18.15.00 2011.02.27.23.40.40 2011.02.28.08.05.412011.02.28.08.14.42 Phys No Closed
19 F 2 N/A 2011.03.01.05.45.00 2011.03.02.21.28.19 2011.03.03.11.28.20 2011.03.03.11.38.21 Phys No Closed
20 G 1 N/A 2011.01.21.04.45.00 2011.03.07.15.41.42 2011.03.07.16.11.43 2011.03.07.16.19.44 Qber Yes Closed
21 H 2 N/A 2011.02.11.14.00.00 2011.03.10.19.10.33 2011.03.11.09.11.22 2011.03.11.09.20.23 cyber Nd Closed
22 H 2 N/A 2011.01.09.22.15.00 2011.03.12.16.09.44 2011.03.12.17.09.45 2011.03.12.17.19.46 cyber Nd Closed
23 I 1 N/A 2011.03.01.21.30.00 2011.03.15.19.33.52 2011.03.16.08.55.53 2011.03.16.10.03.54 Equip Yes Open
24 J 3 N/A 2011.02.11.09.45.00 2011.03.18.23.30.412011.03.18.23.30.412011.03.18.23.39.42 Cyber Nd Closed.
25 J 1 N/A 2011.03.01.22.15.00 2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.52.38 Phys Yes Closed
Metric Development
For the analysis of this case scenario, Metric ID
001, 002, and 003 were created (See Figure 12. Measurement 
Form for Metric ID 001, Figure 13. Measurement Form for 
Metric ID 002, Figure 14. Measurement Form for Metric ID 
003, below). Metric ID 001 looks at the number of 
incidents for the agency based on incident categories 0 
through 6. Metric ID 002 looks at the duration for each 
incident against the time required to report. Metric ID 
003 looks at the percentage of incidents reported on time. 
The analysis identifies the current status of the CSIR 
capabilities as well as usage of the metrics framework.
Step by Step Application
Using the metrics framework, the measurement form is 
applied for each metric developed. First, the objective 
and purpose is clearly stated. Second, the type of 
measurement is identified. Third, the formula and 
description is detailed. Fourth, the data sources and 
responsible parties are identified. Fifth, the audience 
group is selected. Sixth, the frequency of the sample or 
measurement is determined. Seventh, the statement for 
tying the measurement to the organization's mission is 
stated. Eighth, the comments are filled in. Then, after 
55
the first metric is developed, more metrics may be 
developed if needed. Finally, the measurement is conducted 
and the results are analyzed. Depending on the findings, 
action may be taken to improve CSIR capabilities. In the 
case scenario each metric developed will be described, 
following this step by step application. The decisions to 
be made will be identified and resolution will be stated.
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Incident Response Measurement Form Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: Vi nee nt Sritapan
Metric ID001 Number of Incidents for Category 0 - 6
Purpose & Objective Prepare for FISM A Audit 
Determine number of Incidents
Measure Type Check ah that apply:
□ Cost □Time E3 Quality
Formula
Incident Count by Category = Count (Category# Incidents) 
Total lncidentsforAgency=£ Count(CategorvO-6 Incidents)
Description Incident count by category is the number incidents separated by category type. 
Total Incidents for Agency includes all reported incidents for the Agencyfor a 
defined period of time.
Data Source(s) Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)
Responsible Parties Agencyl Head quarters. Di vision 1 
Program Manager: Name
ABC Con tract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst
Audience





Frequency □ Annual □Monthlv DWeeklv □ Dailv bother FISMA YEAR
Tie to Agency Mission He Ips organization understand the volume of Incidents being reported 
intended for FISMA Audit by DHS.
Comments:
Step 1; Determine whatincidents are being reported.
Metric ID 001,002,003,004 All grouped for FISMA Audit in Incident Management
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan
Figure 12. Measurement Form for Metric ID 001
Metric ID 001 is shown in the Figure 11. Measurement
Form for Metric ID 001 above and is a quality measurement
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type that documents at incident counts by category and 
total incidents for the agency. The purpose and objective 
for the measurement is to prepare for the upcoming FISMA 
audit and determine the number of incidents that have 
occurred for the agency. The data source is the agency 
CSIR center (CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The 
responsible parties include the agency program manager and 
the contracting team. The frequency is selected as "other" 
to include the FISMA year. This scenario is defined as 
January 1st, 2011 through May 1st, 2011. This metric is 
tied to the agency's mission since it helps determine the 
volume of incidents reported that are relevant for the 
FISMA audit. The comments section shows that this metric 
is the first step for preparing for the upcoming FISMA 
audit and that metric ID 002, 003, and 004 are all 
related.
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Incident Response Measurement Form Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: Vincent Sritapan
MetriclD002 Duration for Category 0-6 Incidents
Purpose & Objective Preparations for F(SM A Audits
Determine if Age n cy 1 Is c omp 11 ant for reporting incidents
Measure Type CheckaH that apply:
□ Cost 0Time □ Quality
Formula
Duration {Time Created to Time Submitted to US-CERT) less Time Required
Description Time Created is the first official notification time to Agency HQ
Time Submitted to US-CERT is the end time for required timeframe reporting
Time Required depends on Category 0-6 (Please see US-CERT.gov)
Data Source(s) Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs(A through J)
Responsible Parties Agencyl Headquarters, Division 1 
Program Manager: Name







Frequency □ Annual □ Monthly ElWeeklv □ Dai hr 0 Other: FISM A YEAR
Tie to Agency Mission Helps organization meettimeframe reportingcompliance. 
Intended for FfSMA Audit by DHS.
Comments:
Step 2: Determine Duration of Incident Re ports
Metric iD001,002,003,004All grouped for FJSMA Auditin Incident Management
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan
Figure 13. Measurement Form for Metric ID 002
Metric ID 002 is shown in Figure 13. Measurement Form
for Metric ID 002 above is a time measurement type that
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determines the duration of an incident and the time 
required to report. The purpose and objective for the 
measurement is to prepare for the coming FISMA audit and 
determine that the agency is compliant in its timeframe 
reporting. The data source is the agency CSIR center 
(CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The responsible 
parties include the agency program manager and contracting 
team. The frequency is selected as "other" to include the 
FISMA year. This metric is tied to the agency's mission 
because it helps determine if the agency is meeting the 
timeframe reporting requirements. The comments section 
shows that this metric is the second step for preparing 
for the upcoming FISMA audit and that metric ID 002, 003, 
and 004 are all related.
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Incident Response Measurement Form Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: VincentSritapan
MetriclDOOS Percentage of Incidents Reported on Time
Purpose SObjective Pre pa ratio ns for FISMA Audits
Determine if Agency 1 is compliant for reporting incidents
Measure Type Cheek all that apply:
□ Cost ETime S Quality
Formula
iooflncidentsReoortedonTime = Number of Incident Re porte don Time 
Total Number of Incidents Reported
Description Percentage of incidents reported on time is determined by the category type. 
(Please see US-CERT.gov)
Data Source(s) Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)
Responsible Parties Agency 1 Headquarters, Division 1
Program Manager: Name
A8C Contract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst
Audience





Frequency □ Annual □ Monthly □ Weeklv □ Daily 0 Other: FISMA YEAR
Tie to Agency Mission Helps organization meettimeframe reporting compliance, 
intended for FISMA Audit by DHS.
Comments:
Step 3: Determine Compliance percentage
Note: Manage mentwants95%and above on time reporting.
'‘ All Incidents notreportedon time must have documentation.
Metric 10001,002,003,004AII grouped for FISMA Audit in Incident Management
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan
Figure 14. Measurement Form for Metric ID 003
Metric ID 003 is shown in Figure 14. Measurement Form 
for Metric ID 003 above and is a time and quality 
measurement type that determines the percentage of
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incidents reported on time. The purpose and objective for 
the measurement is to prepare for the upcoming FISMA audit 
and determine if the agency is compliant in its timeframe 
reporting. The data source is the agency CSIR center 
(CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The responsible 
parties include the agency program manager and contracting 
team. The frequency is selected as other to include the 
FISMA year. This metric is tied to the agency's mission 
because it helps determine if the agency is meeting their 
timeframe reporting requirements. The comments section 
shows that this metric is the third step for preparing for 
the upcoming FISMA audit and that management requires 95% 
compliance for incidents reported on time.
Scope of Analysis
The analysis shows that there are 25 incidents 
reported for the agency. For this case scenario the agency 
headquarters CSIRT was asked to prepare for the FISMA 
audit based on compliance for timeframe reporting. The 
only points of time that are of interest to the audit are 
the "Created" and "Submit US-CERT" times. At the agency 
headquarters level the time to report begins once the 
incident is reported. Using the given data set the 
"Created" is the time reported at the agency headquarters
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CSIRT level. With the given information all incidents 
regarding PII are required to be reported in one hour of 
notification. The scope of the analysis and its results 





Figure 15. Incident Count by Category
For Metric ID 001 we find that there are a total of 
25 incidents reported within the current FISMA year. Of 
those 25 incidents reported there are 13 category 1 
incidents, 7 category 2 incidents, and 5 category 3 
incidents (See Figure 15. Incident Count by Category,
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Above). Additionally, we can illustrate the results by 
bureau letter in Figure 16. Incident Count by Category and 
Bureau below.
Category and Bureau
For Metric ID 002 we can see that the average time it 
takes for an incident to be reported from the agency 
headquarters CSIRT to US-CERT is about 9 minutes with the 
exception of 2 outliers. The outliers are Ticket No. 10 
and 23 involving bureau I and PII for the incidents. 
Therefore, with the requirement being under one hour, 23 
of the 25 incidents have been reported on time.
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Ticket Mb./ Within 1
Table 2. Duration for Sample Incident Reports
Bureau Cat. Created Submit US-CERT Duration. hour
1 A 1 2011.01.01.15.05.15 2011.01.01.15.15.16 10 min Yes
2 B 2 2011.01.02.10.15.23 2011.01.02.10.25.24 10 min Yes
3 C 1 2011.01.02.11.08.14 2011.01.02.11.18.15 10 min Yes
4 D 1 2011.01.03.11.55.27 2011.01.03.12.05.28 10 min Yes
5 E 3 2011.01.03.19.45.28 2011.01.03.19.54.29 9 min Yes
6 F 1 2011.01.04.05.33.29 2011.01.04.05.42.30 9 mill Yes
7 G 3 2011.01.06.16.10.30 2011.01.06.16.19.31 9 min Yes
8 H 1 2011.01.08.14.52.11 2011.01.08.15.01.12 9 min Yes
9 I 1 2011.01.10.20.16.32 2011.01.10.21.24.33 1 liour 8 min NO
10 J 1 2011.01.12.14.12.12 2011.01.12.14.20.13 8 min Yes
11 A 2 2011.01.18.08.30.22 2011.01.18.08.38.23 8 min Yes
12 B 3 2011.02.14.11.45.56 2011.02.14.11.53.57 8 min Yes
13 B 1 2011.02.13.08.28.00 2011.02.13.08.36.01 8 min. Yes
14 C 3 2011.02.20.11.20.37 2011.02.20.11.30.38 10 min Yes
15 D 2 2011.02.23.20.12.23 2011.02.23.20.21.24 9 min Yes
16 D 1 2011.02.24.20.20.19 2011.02.24.20.29.20 9 min Yes
17 E 1 2011.02.24.18.59.11 2011.02.24.19.08.12 9 min Yes
18 F 2 2011.02.28.08.05.41 2011.02.28.08.14.42 9 min. Yes
19 F 2 2011.03.03.11.28.20 2011.03.03.11.38.21 10 min Yes
20 G 1 2011.03.07.16.11.43 2011.03.07.16.19.44 8 mill Yes
21 H 2 2011.03.11.09.11.22 2011.03.11.09.20.23 9 min Yes
22 H 2 2011.03.12.17.09.45 2011.03.12.17.19.46 10 min Yes
23 I 1 2011.03.16.08.55.53 2011.03.16.10.03.54 1 hour 8 min No
24 J 3 2011.03.18.23.30.41 2011.03.18.23.39.42 9 min Yes
25 J 1 2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.52.38 9 min Yes
The average time to report to US-CERT from the agency
headquarters level is 9 minutes, with the exception of two 
incidents (See Table 2. Duration for Sample Incident 
Reports, Above). This means 23 out of the 25 incidents 
have been reported on time. According the Metric ID 003 
the percentage of incidents reported on time is 92% (See 
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Figure 17. Percentage of Incidents Reporting on Time, 
Below). As noted in the comments section for Metric ID 
003, management requires 95% compliance for on time 
incident reporting. With this result, careful 
consideration is needed to determine the root cause of the 
problem and possible actions may need to be taken to 
ensure on time reporting.





|______ List of Root Causes_______ ;
I_____ Policies not defined____ _
l Improperbusiness process design { 
Improper network architecture 
j Improper network configuration ; 
i _ Lack of training________ \
j Incomplete audits_______
i Insufficient resources_____ '
I Policies not enforced ;
(Allen, & Davis, 2010)_________________________
Figure 18. List of Root Causes by Computer Emergency 
Response Team Coordination Center
With further analysis from the case scenario the root 
cause has been identified. A list of known root causes can 
be found in Figure 18. List of Root Causes by Computer 
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center above. By 
looking at the data set, the bureau where the incident 
originated from is bureau I. With further investigation 
the root cause is determined to be the lack of information 
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provided, from the incident reported by bureau I. This 
causes the submission from the agency to US-CERT to be 
delayed. The policy at the agency level does not clearly 
outline the minimum requirement to submit via incident 
category 0-6. Additionally, the policy does not properly 
utilize category 6 for incidents that are still under 
investigation.
Decision to Be Made By Management
For this scenario management must decide whether to 
report incidents to US-CERT even when lacking information 
or require the bureaus to use category 6 for incidents 
that are lacking information. The cost measurement is 
shown in Figure 19. Measurement Form for Metric ID 004 
below. Metric ID 004 measures the cost to change policy at 
the agency level, including the cost to notify and train 
bureau CSIRTs on using category 6 type incidents.
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Incident Response Measurement Form Date: 2 011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: Vincent Sritapan
Metric ID 004 Cost to Change Reporting Procedure
Purpose & Objective Improve Incident Reporting Process 
Measure Cost BenefitforChangingReporting Procedures
Measure Type Check al! that apply:
E Cost □Time □ Quality
Formula
Cost of Policy Change = Rate(laborHours for Revision & Notification) 
Materials for Notification
Description Labor rate may vary for revision and notification
Materials for notification include training costs to update Bureau CSIRTs
Data SoLirce(s) Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)
Responsible Parties Agency ! Headquarters, Division 1 
Program Manager: Name
ABC Contract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst
Audience





Frequency □ Annual □ Monthly □ Weekly □ Daily E Other: FISMA YEAR.
Tie to Agency Mission Helps organization meet timeframe reportingcompliance. 
Intended for FISMA Audit by OHS.
Comments:
Determine Cost Change Reporting Procedures
Metric 10 001,002,003,004All grouped for FISMA Audit In Incident Management.
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Srttapan
Figure 19. Measurement Form for Metric ID 004
For simplification, the results of Metric ID 004 find 
that it costs $10,000 to change the policy and 
notify/train CSIRT staff. Management finds that clearly
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defining use of category 6 solves the issue of on time 
reporting.
Summary
The case scenario was a basic illustration that used 
the metrics framework to support improvement in CSIR 
capabilities. For each measurement form developed, the 
metric ID always started by stating a purpose or 
objective, illustrating the driving force for the 
measurement. The measurement form was used to prepare for 
upcoming FISMA and IG audits, particular to incident 
management. The security measurement for CSIR ties into 
the agency's mission as it enables them to pass audit 
requirements and continue services that are mission 
critical. The metrics framework provided was a simplistic 
framework that identifies the necessary components needed 





Chapter Six provides the conclusions and 
recommendations as
the purpose of the
a result of this project. It reinforces 
metrics framework and the need for CSIR
metrics within the federal government.
The
Conclusions
conclusions drawn from the metrics framework for
CSIR are as follows:
1. There are three types of measurements for
measuring CSIR.
2 . Measurements must be driven by objectives and 
goals.
3 . Consideration of the audience needs to identify
CSIRT metrics and results are critical for 
satisfying the audience.
4. Tying measurements to the agency's mission is 
essential to the success of the security 
measurement, enabling the user to show the value 
within a CSIR program.
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Recommendations
The recommendations as a result of the metrics 
framework for CSIR are as follows:
1. Use the metrics framework and accompanying 
measurement form to measure CSIR performance.
2. Save security metric formulas and notes for 
CSIR.
3. Collaborate and share security metric 
developments with others to save time and money.
4. Routinely measure CSIR capabilities for 
continuous improvement and to illustrate its 
value in supporting the agency's mission.
Summary
Chapter Six reviews the drawn conclusions and the 
derived recommendations for this developed metrics 
framework. The overall metrics framework for CSIR is an 
effort to provide a standard model that supports security 
metric evaluations for CSIR. I sincerely hope in the 
future, the public and private sector can come together to 
create meaningful security metrics for all. As with this 
metrics framework, the hope is to provide a framework 
where security measurements provide accountability and 
support the agency's mission.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM
REPORTING CRITERIA
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Federal Agency Incident Categories
Category Name Description Reporting Timeframe
CATO Exercise/Network 
Defense Testing
This category is used during state, federal, 
national,.international exercises and approved, 
activity testing of intern a l/external network 
defenses or responses.
Not Applicable; this category is for 
each agency's internal use during 
exercises.
CAT 1 "“Unauthorized 
Access
In this category an individual gains logical or 
physical .access without permission to a federal 
agency network, system, application, data, or 
other resource
Within one (1) hour of 
discovery/detection.
CAT 2 "Denial of Service 
(DoS)
An attack that successfully prevents or impairs 
tine normal authorized functionality of. networks, 
systems or applications by exhausting 
resources. This activity, includes being the victim1 
or participating in the DoS.
Within two (2) hours of 
discovery/detection if the 
successful attack is still ongoing 
and the agency is unable'to 
successfully mitigate activity.
CAT 3 "Malicious Code Successful installation of malicious software - 
(e.g., virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other 
code-based malicious entity) that infects an 
operating system or application. Agencies are 
NOT required to report malicious logic that has 
been successfully quarantined by antivirus (AV) 
software.
Daily
Note: Within one (1) hour of 
discovery/detection if widespread 
across agency.





This category includes any activity that seeks to 
access or identify a federal agency computer, 
open ports, protocols, service, or any 
combination for later exploit. This activity does 
not directly result in a compromise or dental of 
service.
Monthly
Note: If system is classified, 
report within one (1) hour of 
discovery.
■ CATS Investigation Unconfirmed incidents that are potentially 
malicious or anomalous activity deemed by the 
reporting entity to warrant further review.
Not Applicable; this category is for, 
each agency's use to categorize a 
potential incident that is currently 
being investigated.
“Defined by NIST Special Publication 800-61




FORMULAS FOR COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE
BY CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY
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C01 = £(Di rect Loss ! Cost of Business System Downti me + Cost of 
Containment! Cost of Recovery! Cost of Restitution)
Cost of Incidents
MCOI =
(Direct _Loss +Cost _ Bu sinks'—Downtime +
Cost — Containment + Cas7 Recove/’v + Cost-Restitution)
Count(Incidents)
Mean Cost of Incidents
MIRC =
Count (Incidents)




Mean Time to Incident Discovery
MTBSI=
^(Date-Of_Occurence[Incidentn ] - Date_of_Occurence [Incident^ ])
Count(Incidents)
Mean Time between Security incidents
Y,(Date_ of Recovery - Date_of_Occiirrence) 
d*  ~ddd -
Coimt(Incidents)
Mean Time to Incident Response





ACISO: Associate Chief Information Security Officer
CERT/CC: Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center
CERT: Computer Emergency Response Team
CIO: Chief Information Officer
C1SO: Chief Information Security Officer
CMU: Carnegie Mellon University
CSIR: Computer Security Incident Response
CSIRC: Computer Security Incident Response Center
CSIRT: Computer Security Incident Response Team
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
FISMA: Federal Information Security Management Act
FIRST: Forum on Incident Response and Security Teams
ID: Identification
IDS: Intrusion Detection System
1G: Inspector General
IR: Incident Response
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
PII: Personally Identifiable Information
SEI: Software Engineering Institute
US-CERT: United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
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